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1. Introduction
Pietroski (2018) offers a sparse theory of natural language semantic 
composition. According to the theory, the meanings of lexical items and 
syntactic structures are ‘instructions’ to fetch concepts, and such con-
cepts are combinable by just two operations that allow for the construc-
tion of denumerably many complex concepts (‘sentence meanings’). 
Pietroski does not affect to have solved all problems, or even to have of-
fered a complete framework. His goal, at least as I read him, is to show 
how semantics might be done in a new way unburdened by many of the 
assumptions of the truth-conditional tradition, both in terms of com-
positional technology and philosophical baggage. I applaud the endea-
vour. The open question is how well the framework serves to capture 
the gamut of phenomena traditional theories target, and whether it 
offers novel insight. As a methodological precept, I think it is invidious 
to hold new frameworks to higher standards than we ask traditional 
ones to meet. In other words, one should always ask whether the tradi-
tional accounts are really so successful according to whatever objective 
standards are appropriate, for standards of explanation are often fi xed 
by the received theoretical framework at issue. Such considerations 
284 J. Collins, Conjoining and the Weak/Strong Quantifi er Distinction
are particularly germane to the present case, as we shall see. Tradi-
tional semantics marries a highly expressive meta-theory with mostly 
descriptive desiderata. Its success at descriptive coverage, therefore, 
fl ows from the expressive resources that stand in need of explanatory 
justifi cation. It is to Pietroski’s great credit that he seeks to show how 
explanatory traction can be achieved by such minimal resources. These 
morals will be given some substance in the second section.1 Thereaf-
ter, my concern will be for how Pietroski’s framework might explain 
the weak/strong distinction in the domain of quantifi cation. I have no 
settled answer here, but do examine a few options. At any rate, the dis-
tinction is an interesting topic for further inquiry into the framework 
on offer.
2. Sparseness
Pietroski’s model is sparse because it eschews the ‘full Frege’ of seman-
tic types:
(FF) (i) e and t are types.
 (ii) If <x> and <y> are types, then <x, y> is a type.
 (iii) These are all the types.
This gives us denumerably many types to map onto lexical items and 
their composition into phrases:
(T) (i) <e, t>: monadic predicates, such as predicative adjectives, 
relative clauses, and intransitive verbs (red, sleep, etc.)
 (ii) <e <e, t>>: dyadic relations, such as transitive verbs (loves, 
kicks).
 (iii) <<e, t>, <<e, t>. t>>: 2-place determiners (every, most, etc.)
 (iv) <<e, t>., t>: determiner phrases (every man, etc.). 
 (v) <<e, t>, <e, t>>: attributive adjectives (red in red car, etc.)
 (vi) <t,<t, ,t>>: dyadic sentence connectives (and, or, etc.)
 (vii) <t, t>: sentence-level adverbs (necessarily, possibly, etc.)
 (viii) <<e>, <<e, t>, <e, t>>>: prepositions, understood as VP 
modifi ers (about, to, etc.)
In place of (FF), Pietroski presents just two compositional types, with 
primitive lexical content being virtually wholly monadic, and syntactic 
structure introducing restricted dyadic relations. Crucially, the model 
does not involve denumerably many non-applicable types as does the 
full Frege, i.e., types that do not correspond to any linguistic structure. 
The model does help itself to the ‘full Chomsky’ of syntactic structures, 
but that is independently required, unlike the Fregean hierarchy.
1 For further discussion of these broad issues, see Collins (2020).
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3. Two types
The fi rst operation conjoins two predicates (simple or complex) and 
identifi es a shared single argument position:
(M-Join) (_)(_)
Don’t think of the gaps here as variables, but simply as a way of speci-
fying the adicity of both the constituent and complex types, where the 
blanks are read as identical (having a co-application). Thus, it does no 
harm to render the result of M-Join as ‘(_)’. For example, (1a) has 
the expected interpretation:
(1) a BROWN(_)COW(_)
 b ‘BROWN(_)COW(_)’ applies to e iff e is brown and a cow.
The second operation introduces a dash of dyadicity:
(D-Join) [(..., _)(_)]2
The dyadic concepts correspond to, for example, prepositions (above, 
with, etc.), and also, thematic concepts. So,
(2) ‘[PATIENT(..., _)A-BROWN(_)COW(_)]’ applies to e iff e 
involves a brown cow being affected.
The theory does not tell us that e ranges over events, as if we had an 
independent understanding of what events are; rather, semantically, 
we simply take such a complex concept as applying to ‘things’ that can 
have participants being affected, where such particpants are the kind 
of things that can the applicands of monadic concepts that we can M-
Join to the results of D-Join.
(3) CHASE(...)[PATIENT(..., _)[A-BROWN(_)COW(_)]]
This gives us the content for the VP chase a brown cow (forget about 
the determiner, which complicates the presentation for my purposes).
(3) above gives way to 
(4) CHASE(...)[INTERNAL(..., _)A-BROWN(_)COW(_)]
That a brown cow is construed thematically as PATIENT is a property 
determined by the verb chase, not the very syntax or the mere labels <V, 
N>. A similar story can be readily told for external arguments provided 
by a functional head v that projects to vP by taking a VP as a comple-
ment and a DP(/NP) as its SPEC, which is the external argument po-
sition. Thus [vP v [VP V N]] fetches a dyadic concept that M-Joins with 
whatever concept the external argument fetches (A-DOG(_), say). Thus:
(5) [EXTERNAL(…,_)A-DOG(_)][CHASE(...)[INTERNAL
(..., _)A-BROWN(_)COW(_)]]
2 D-Join is not to be confused with Kratzer’s (1996) event identifi cation rule. The 
latter introduces an external argument of a verb as an agent participant of an event 
already specifi ed. Thus, Kratzer’s rule, like Pietroski’s, involves the co-identifi cation 
of a position in two composed predicates/functions, but that is where the similarity 
ends. D-Join specifi es the character of an internal argument and introduces a further 
position without any thematic specifi cation of it.
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Generalising, the tactic is to treat the syntax of a phrase as fetching 
what we might think of as a functional dyadic concept expressed by the 
meaning of the lexical item as syntactically projected that provides the 
applicand for the open argument of the predicate (Pietroski calls such 
concepts adapter concepts).
With so much in place, let’s now turn to quantifi cation.
4. Quantifi cation: the generalised view
The problem with fi rst-order quantifi cational theory (as a model of NL) 
is that it (i) doesn’t generalise across all determiners (Dets) (most, few, 
etc.); (ii) is wedded to an invented syntax+composition; and (iii) fails 
to express generalisations across Dets and within the classes of Dets.
The basic fact about fi rst-order quantifi cation is that it depicts natu-
ral language Dets as sortally reducible:
(SR) Where R is a Boolean relation and U is the universe, Q[A, B]  
QU[R(A, B)]
Here we take a determiner to express a quantifi er as a relation over 
the Cartesian product of U that specifi es a cardinality for the pairs. 
This general approach is nowadays referred to as generalised quanti-
fi er theory (see Peters and Westerståhl, 2006, for extensive overview). 
SR holds for every, some, no, but not for most and other comparative 
relations that cannot be rendered as relations over the whole of the uni-
verse.3 All Det relations, however, are specifi able as functions defi ned 
over the Cartesian products:
(6) a every: f: < A  B>  |A ― B| = ∅ (i.e., A ⊆ B) 
 b some, a: f: < A  B>  |A ∩ B| ≠ ∅ 
 c no: f: < A  B>  |A ∩ B| = ∅ 
 d most: f: < A  B>  |A ∩ B| > |A―B|
A striking generalisation that issues from this approach is that all 
quantifi er relations expressed by natural language Dets are conserva-
tive (Barwise and Cooper 1981):
(CONS) Q[A, B]  Q[A, A ∩ B]
The truth of Q[A, B] ‘lives on’ the restriction A in the sense that how 
things are with the As alone determines truth value.
(7) a Some boy is a thief iff Some boy is a boy who is a thief
 b Every girl is a swimmer iff every girl is a girl who is a swimmer
 c Most women sing iff most women are women who sing
3 In simple terms, a sentence such as Most boys swim cannot be rendered as 
a claim about the whole universe along the lines of Most things are such that… 
Although this expressive limitation of fi rst-order quantifi cation is widely recognised, 
its full philosophical consequences have yet to be properly registered. For example, 
defl ationary approaches to truth often assume that the truth predicate is a device 
for generalisation over instances of a fi rst-order scheme, but no such account can 
generalise to Most things Bill says are true (see Collins 2010).
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Any theory of natural language Dets, therefore, should at least capture 
conservativity.
5. The Pietroski view of determiners
5.1. First pass
Take Dets to apply to ordered pairs, per the GQ approach, and to M-
Join with internal arguments formed via D-Join:
(8) SOME(…)[INTERNAL(..., _)MAX:SPY(_)],
where MAX is a concept expressing the maximisation of the concept to 
which it applies. A predicate is formed as expected:
(9) [EXTERNAL(..., _)MAX:GERMAN(_)]
M-Joining the two, we have
(10) [SOME(…)[INTERNAL(..., _)MAX:SPY(_)]]  
[EXTERNAL(..., _)MAX:GERMAN(_)]
This applies to all pairs that are such that the internal participant is 
an external participant, and the former is a spy and the latter is Ger-
man. Polarising, a la Tarski, (10) applies to each pair so long as at least 
one pair satisfi es the conditions (mutatis mutandis for other Dets).
So far so good, but the scoping behaviour of Dets is eldided.
5.2. Second pass: QR-ed Dets
Assume that DPs undergo syntactic movement in order to acquire 
scope, creating structures akin to open sentences:
(11) [DP Every girl]1 [XP 1 likes Sam]
What concepts do the ‘open sentences’ map onto (fetch)?
Assume a concept TARSKI (Pietroski 2018: 321).
(12) TARSKI[i, P] = ()[((')[' i   ASSIGNED-BY-TO[_, ', i]) 
 SAT[', P]))  SAT[, P]]
This is not how Pietroski presents it, but it is equivalent. The basic idea 
is to understand open sentences in terms of their satisfaction relative 
to an index i under the standard Tarski condition. 
Thus, we can have:
(13) [EVERY(…)[INTERNAL(..., _)MAX:GIRL(_)]]i 
[EXTERNAL(..., _)
 MAX:TARSKI[i, _likes Sam]]
Again, so far, so good, but CONS is not refl ected.
5.3. Third pass
On the standard treatment of natural language quantifi cation offered 
by Heim and Kratzer (1998), which Pietroski uses as a foil, an open sen-
tence is akin to a syncategorematic relative clause, but relative clauses 
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are not open sentences (Pietroski 2018: 337). Linguistically, raised DPs 
should merge with clause-like structures from which they serve as ar-
guments of verbs. Rendering a Det as <<e, t>, <<e, t>. t>>> makes it 
as if a second-order relation between monadic properties, which then 
creates the type-mismatch problems, for <<e, t>, t> is not an <e>.
Let’s take composition seriously, therefore: the DP both merges as 
an argument of a verb and merges with a clause (in its raised position). 
Thus, the internal and external arguments of a Det are fundamental-
ly asymmetric, with the former restricting the range of the Det a la 
CONS. Pietroski implements this asymmetry via a modifi cation on the 
TARSKI predicate.
 (14) RESTRICTIVE-TARSKI[i, P] = ()[((')[' i   ASSIGNED-
BY-TO[_, ', i]  SAT[', P]  SAT[', EXTERNAL[P’])  
SAT[, P]]
Again, this is my formulation, but the content is equivalent to Pi-
etroski’s defi nition.
We arrive, therefore, at a model of quantifi cation that is compatible 
with the generalised quantifi er framework, respects the movement of 
DPs to take scope, and can be conditioned to respect CONS. It bears 
noting that the defi nitions here are part of the meta-theory, not the 
compositional principles themselves, i.e., we defi ne the relevant con-
cepts in terms of satisfaction, but satisfaction is not part of the compo-
sitional analysis.
Hereafter, we shall look at the weak/strong distinction between nat-
ural language Dets and consider what resources Pietroski might have 
to capture the distinction.
6. The distinction between weak and strong determiners
Prior to Milsark (1977), a general distinction prevailed between defi -
nites and indefi nites, but a deeper distinction was hand that has been 
the focus of much attention:
Weak: some, a, no, one, two, few, many, several,…
Strong: every, all, the, most, Sam, both, neither,…
Pro tem, think of the weak Dets as being existential, in some sense, 
whereas the strong Dets are universal, in some sense (clarity will be of-
fered soon). Note that this distinction cross-classifi es the defi nite/indef-
inite distinction; for example, numerical Dets are defi nite, but pattern 
with indefi nite a, and indefi nite most patterns with defi nite every. Also 
worth noting is some weak Dets can have strong construals, although 
not the reverse.4 For our purposes, imagine that the distinction cleanly 
divides determiners into two classes.
4 Strong DPs do not produce an ambiguity with individual- or stage-level 
predicates:
(i) a Every girl is clever/is in the garden
     b Most boys wear shorts/have boarded the plane
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7. Three conditions
The w/d distinction is grounded in three central semantic phenomena.
7.1. Existentials 
There can be weak, but not strong, DP associates in existentials:
(16) a There is [DP a bee] [C in the room]
 b There are [DP some cowboys] [C here]
 c There are [DP few girls] [C still to see] 
 d */# There is [DP the man][C in the room]
 e */# There is [DP every cowboy][C here]
 f */# There are [DP most girls][C still to see] 
Here I take the predicates (labelled ‘c’ for coda) to be non-constituents 
of the DPs in order to preclude a so-called ‘list’ reading, which is a spe-
cifi cally focused use that can rescue the unacceptable case.5 There are 
also presentational readings, where there is locative, but, again, we are 
just interested in the existential readings.
7.2. Weak Dets have symmetrical arguments (Keenan 1987, 2003)
The condition here is slef-explanatory, but to be precise:
(SYM) Q(A, B)  Q(B, A)
(17) a Some men are nurses
 b Some nurses are men
 c Few women are engineers 
 d Few engineers are women
If the fi rst of the pairs is true, the second is true, too, so long as the de-
terminers are weak. Strong determiners do not license the entailment:
If we bracket domain restriction, these sentences are unambiguously universal 
claims about the set of girls/boys. Similarly, weak DPs are typically uniform in 
construal across the two sorts of predicate. Obviously, the construal differs in being 
existential, in the sense in which some things are said to satisfy the restriction (i.e., 
exist), in a way (i) does not. Some determiners are atypical, such as few. Consider:
(ii)a Few girls are clever
     b Few girls are in the garden
(iia) can only be construed as true where most girls are not clever. It has no 
partitive reading where some small number of girls are clever, but the rest might 
be smart. In contrast, (iib) precisely has such a duality of construal. It might be a 
claim that the garden contains a small number of girls (three, say), or the ‘strong’ 
claim that few of the girls (i.e., a small percentage) are in the garden, which might 
be a huge number, depending on the number of girls. This is said to be the ‘strong’ 
reading because it is about the set of the restriction as a whole, rather than some 
defi nite number of girls.
5 A ‘list’ reading goes with a focused unit in response to a question, say. For 
example: A: Who will save us now the cavalry have left? B: Well, there is every 
cowboy still here. The weak cases can be expressed with the coda as a conjunct 
(There is a bee and it is in the garden) or relative clause (There is a bee, which is in 
the garden). List readings aren’t so supported. The DP+codas in list readings might 
thus be small clauses.
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(18) a Every man is a nurse
 b Every nurse is a man
 c Most women are engineers 
 d Most engineers are women
7.3. Weak Dets are intersective
(INS) Q(A, B)  Q(A  B).
(INS) offers a different kind of test: if ‘Det As are Bs’ is weak, then it is 
equivalent to ‘Det As, who are Bs, are Cs’ where B ⊆ C. The truth of a 
statement involving an intersective DP as subject wholly depends upon 
the intersection of the class of things that are both A and B―one may 
ignore the A things that are non-B. Thus:
(19) a Some man is a nurse
 b Some man, who is a nurse, is a care worker
 c Two men are nurses
 d Two men, who are nurses, are care workers
(20) a Every man is a nurse
 b Every man, who is a nurse, is a care worker
 c Most men are nurses
 d Most men, who are nurses, are care workers
The pairs in (19) cannot differ in truth value. Note, in particular, that 
both depend upon the men existing. Thus, (19b, d) are not tautologi-
cal. If there are no men, say, then (19b) can’t be true, and (19d) fails 
to be true if there is just one man. In (20), a difference in truth value 
between the pairs not only can obtain, but clearly does obtain in fact. 
(20a) is false, whereas (20b) is a tautology; ditto for (20d).
7.4. A signifi cant fact
Given the conservativity of natural language determiners, (SYM) and 
(INS) are equivalent (see Peters and Westerståhl 2006: 210-11). That is:
(CONS)+(INS) entails (SYM), and (CONS)+(SYM) entails (INS)
8. Pietroski’s options
8.1. Pragmatics 
A ready option is to seek to capture the w/d distinction in terms of 
pragmatics rather than compositional semantics. It is unclear how this 
tactic might be realised, notwithstanding the common thought that 
strong utterances, as it were, presuppose existence rather assert it. 
We should still want to know why such a difference is tethered to the 
Dets and their differential behaviour with exstentials. For example, 
whereas a presuppositional account might explain the felt unaccept-
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ability of an empty restrictor for strong Dets, the behaviour of the weak 
Dets remains opaque.6
More generally, since CONS is not a pragmatic principle, and inter-
acts with SYM and INS, it would be nice if all these algebraic proper-
ties fell together under the one semantic explanation; indeed, the W/S 
phenomena look (almost) as robust as the CONS phenomena.
8.2. Encode SYM or INS for the W cases, and let CONS do the rest
Recall our signifi cant fact. CONS+SYM entails INS, and CONS+INS 
entails SYM. If CONS is encoded, therefore, we really only need to en-
code one of the other properties. Perhaps the easiest implementation 
of this idea is to let the internal predicate be RESTRICTED-TARSKI 
modifi ed by the satisfaction of the external predicate for the weak Dets 
alone. Such would satisfy SYM, and so entail INS.
I can see two main problems with this thought. Firstly, it is not 
obvious how to make it work compositionally, i.e., why should there be 
a restriction going up the syntactic tree? The restriction going down 
tracks the syntactic movement of the DP. In short, it appears to be 
a stipulation. Secondly, the there-existential restriction to weak Dets 
would remain unexplained. I shall come back to this shortly below.
8.3. An alternative
Suppose that only the weak Dets encode or fetch an empty internal 
monadic concept that we may render intuitively as ‘x is in the domain’, 
but when combined with the Det effectively encodes the idea that a car-
dinality of things that satisfy the predicates exists. This captures the 
existential content of the weak Dets and simultaneously explains why 
the strong Dets admit empty restrictors. For example:
(21) [SOME(…)DOMAIN(…) ([INTERNAL(..., _)MAX:GIRL(_)]]i
 
[EXTERNAL(..., _)MAX-RESTRICTED-TARSKI[i, _likes 
Sam]]
Being more speculative, we may think, on this story, that weak Dets 
‘originate’ from a means of talking about some ‘relevant’ domain, 
whereas the strong Dets don’t. Thus, the latter don’t introduce a do-
main but have a global or universal meaning (more anon).
Let’s see how this basic idea might fair in accommodating the basic 
properties of the w/s distinction.
Firstly, the proposal accommodates SYM, for with weak Dets, a do-
main is populated with a kind of thing (or things) that has the inter-
nal property, which is also said to have the external property, and so 
6 It is common to think of strong Dets as presupposing a non-empty restriction, 
hence the supposed infelicity of Every French king is bald. It is better, I think, to 
account for the infelicity as due to implicature.
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whatever condition the Det places on the thing(s) having the internal 
property will hold of the external property too. Not so for strong Dets, 
where no domain is populated by things.
Secondly, the proposal accommodates INS, for, again, whatever 
kinds of things are in the domain share the properties of the internal 
and external predicates. With strong Dets, since there is no domain, we 
can have an empty-restrictor reading in line with the non-intersective 
relation of the strong Det.
Thirdly, the proposal also accommodates the fact that some weak 
Dets can be read strongly. For example, the weak construal of few is as 
expected, with the domain populated by few things that are both girls 
and in the park, as might be. On the strong reading, the domain is still 
populated (no empty-restrictor reading is available), but some broader 
group of girls than just those in the park must be understood to exist. 
In effect, the content is partitive.
Fourthly, the there-existential restriction to weak associates is nice-
ly accommodated. In the weak cases the domain is populated, which 
is actually just what the bare existential says. The strong Dets encode 
no domain, and so they have no existential reading, unless a domain 
is explicitly introduced via presentation or ‘list’, which are, of course, 
supported by strong Dets.
In the following section I shall dwell somewhat on existentials, for 
they add some interesting support to my general proposal.
9: Some syntactic considerations (after Kayne 2019)7
According to Kayne (2019) there are four possible construals of there 
exhibited in (22):
(22) Theree are two fi les therel on the desk, which thereforer need 
fi ling in them therep cabinets.
So, there can can be existential, locative, rationale, and presentational 
readings. Instead of positing a 4-way ambiguity, let there have a basic 
presentational construal fi xed in a low small clause with its associate; 
the other construals are confi gurationally fi xed. In particular, for the 
existential, there obligatorily moves to SPEC-TP (subject). Of course, 
this makes sense of the general syntactic differences, between existen-
tial there and locative there.8
7 Herburger (2000) offers other syntactic reasons why strong Dets must move to 
SPEC-TP
8 Neither of the them receive a theta-role, but locative there is not an argument, 
while existential there is, albeit an expletive. Syntactically, this shows up in various 
ways. Firstly, locative there cannot occur in a tag question:
(i) *There is your dog, isn’t there?
Secondly, it does not admit raising:
(ii)a There seems to be a dog in the garden
     b *There seems to be your dog
Thirdly, locative there cannot be negated:
(iii) *There isn’t your dog
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None of this by itself essentially bears on the w/s distinction. Kayne 
merely notes that there must be ‘some constraint’. Note, however, that 
the existential there is still presentational content-wise; it is only ex-
istential confi gurationally. Suppose, then, that there is always fi rst 
merged in a small clause with its associate and interpretation hap-
pens throughout the derivation, not just at LF or some other completed 
structure. If we now also posit a domain predicate with weak Dets, 
then the small clause will be interpretable with presentational there. If 
the Det is strong, and so lacks a domain, the presentational there will 
be uninterpretable. Thus, we get to explain the existential restriction 
on the assumption of Kayne’s model and the weak Dets introducing a 
domain predicate.
10. Conclusion
I hardly think what I have said here is the end of the matter, or even 
the beginning of the end of the matter. I suspect it might not even be 
the end of the beginning of the matter. I commend the topic for further 
inquiry within Pietroski’s basic framework.9
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